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David Mullan"

Tribunals Imitating Courts - Foolish
Flattery or Sound Policy?'

In his 2004 Horace E Read Memorial Lecture, David Mullan assesses the impact of
the "dueprocess explosion." To what e tent has the evolution of Canadian law (both
statutory and common) in the domain of procedural fairness been responsible for
the phenomenon of e x'cessive judicializationof the administrative process? Has the
increase in the number of decision-makers subject to the obligation of procedural
fairness and the growth in the parallels between tribunal and court processes
affected adversely the interests of the administrative justice system and the public
that it is meant to serve? The author suggests that there is a basis for this concern.
He also argues that one potentially profitable way of dealing with it is for tribunals to
recognize that they do not always have to function in the same way procedurally for
all matters coming before them for resolution. While some tribunals have accepted
this and make provision in their rules for variegated procedures depending on
context, the author contends that the time may now have come to legislate for this
possibility in the manner of the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act.
Dans la conference qu'il pronongait en 2004 dans le cadre des Horace E Read
MemorialLecture. DavidMu/lan evaluaitl'incidencedel'augmentationexponentlelle
du nombre d'affaires ou une partie a invoqu6 le droit I'applicationreguliere de
la loi. Dans quelle mesure l'6volution du droit au Canada (tant les textes de loi
que la common law) dans le domaine de 'equit6 procedurale est-elle A blAmer
pour le phenomene de judiciansation excessive du processus administratif?
L'augmentationdu nombre de decideurssoumis J lobligation d'6quite procddurale
et la croissance des parallles entre les processus des tribunaux et des cours ontelles eu une incidence negative sur les intdrets du systeme judiciaire administratif
et sur le public que le systeme doit servir? L'auteur avance que cette inquietude
serait fond~e. f/ pretend en outre qu une fagon potentiellement rentable de
regler la question serait que les tribunaux reconnaissent qu'ils n'ont pas toujours
6 suivre la meme procedure pour toutes les questions qu ils doivent trancher.
Meme si certains tribunaux ont accept6 ce fait et integr6 dans leurs r6gles des
dispositions prevoyant des procedures differentes en fonction des contextes,
I'auteur pretend qu'il est peut-6tre temps de legiferer sur cette possibilit6,
la fagon de la Model State Administrative Procedure Act amdricaine de 1981.

*

1.

Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
This is a revised version of the 2004 Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture, delivered on January

22, 2004. 1 am very grateful for the assistance of Martha Boyle, LL.B/M.P.A. (Queen's, 2004) and
Michael Gottheil, Chair of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. More generally, I want to express
my thanks for the mentoring that Innis Christie, Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University, provided me, both as a graduate student in 1970-1971 and as a junior colleague from 1973

to 1977.
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Prologue

Many thanks to the Faculty and to the Read family for the invitation to
deliver this year's Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture. I was ajunior faculty
member here on the occasion of the first Read Lecture in 1976.' The
thought never crossed my mind that I would one day return to Dalhousie
to gi e that lecture.
When I came to the Dalhousie Law School from Queen's in 1973, Dean
Read \%as still a frequent presence around the faculty. He was someone
who had a formidable reputation yet he was particularly welcoming to
new faculty members and, in my case, especially so when he learned that I
%ould be teaching Contracts and using the current edition of his casebook
on that subject. I had also learned of Dean Read from the founding dean
of the Queen's Universitv Faculty of Law. William R. Lederman, whose
own teaching career had started at Dalhousie. In John Willis's Histoiy of
Dalhousie Law School,3 Lederman praises Dean Read as a "'fine scholar,"
a distinguished public servant, and a dean whose example he was proud to
follow in fulfilling his decanal responsibilities at Queen's.' It is therefore
a privilege to deliver the lecture established in honour of one of the great
leaders of this faculty.
Intowhition
One of the characteristics of Canadian administrative law over the past
thirt,-fie years has been, to borrow an American expression, the "due
process explosion."' As a result of both common law developments and
2

The inaugural lecture \%as given hN Protcsr John M. Kernochan, Professor of Legislation at
durriia Univerit ) Skiool ofl a\. It appeared a. "Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method"
I76) 3 ID LJ. 337.
John ,, i'. I Hivton . of Ihq/1)aiff Law School (Toronto: Uniersity of Toronto Press, 1979).
4.
Ibhd at 133.
5.
Aterm coined h\ licnry J. Friendly in "Some Kind of Hearing"(1975) 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1267.
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statutory change, there has been a very significant increase in the procedural
..protections" that the State must accord those \ ith whom it deals. In most
respects, there can be no doubting that this is a highly desirable evolution
in our law. For a whole host of reasons, including ensuring the "accuracy"
of decision-making and providing the balm that comes from being heard
when a decision affects your key interests, procedural fairness is an
essential part of sound administrative practices and moral virtue. Indeed,
the struggle for adequate procedural fairness is almost certainly still not
over. The nature of much administrative law litigation testifies to that as
do recent important government-sponsored studies on the nature of the
administrative process in. for example, Nova Scotia,6 British Columbia,7
and also the United Kingdom.'
What is,however, emerging more and more as a concern is the
extent to which, at least in some contexts, Canadian law may have gone
too far in the nature and the extent of procedural fairness obligations
that are imposed on or adopted by some decision-makers. In particular,
there is a sense abroad, as reflected in the title to this lecture, that many
agencies and tribunals are almost indistinguishable from regular courts in
the procedures that attend the exercise of their responsibilities: that they
function in the manner of a traditional adversarial adjudicatixe model.
That raises questions about whether it is a good thing, particularly if one's
vision of the administrati e process is one of providing an alternative to
the regular courts in order to ensure more accessible, speedy and efficient
decision-making. As a result of the "due process explosion," have we
reached the stage where proceedings before some agencies and tribunals
have become so procedurally hide-bound as to operate in conflict with
their essential mission; where the delivery of substantive programmes is
being compromised by the procedures attendant on their delivery? In short,
is there a point at which so-called 'procedural protections" can stand in
the way of providing justice? Those are the essential questions that I want
to explore in a preliminary or tentative way in this lecture - tentative or
preliminary, not because these concerns represent new insights (they have
6.
La\%Reform Commission of Nova Scotia, Final Report on Reform of the Administrative Justice
System in Nova Scotia (Hal ifax:
Law Reform Commission of No\ a Scotia, 1997).
7. See, generally, Attorney General of British Columbia, On Balance: Guiding Principles for
Administrative Justice Reform in British Columbia (Victoria: 2002), the administrative procedure
sections of which were much influenced by Ministry of Attorney General, The Statutory Powers and
ProceduresofAdministrative Tribunals in British Columbia (Victoria: 2002) (prepared by Frank A.V.
Falzon). Subsequently, there was Ministry of Attorney General. Model Statutor , Powers Prorisimw
for Administrative Tribunals (Victoria: 2003). All of this led to the Administrative Tribunals Act,
S.B.C. 2004, c. 45.
8.
Sir Andrew Leggatt, "Tribunals for Users-One System, One Service" (March 2001), online:
Review of Tribunals <http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk>.
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been with us for quite some time) but because I believe that this is a
complex issue and requires much work before we grasp its dimensions
fully.
In the first part of the lecture, I wrill provide a general overview of the
extent and causes of the "due process explosion." I will then attempt to
expose some of the problems that have arisen because of it. Finally, I will
explore ways in which those problems might be reduced or minimized.
In this context, I will pay particular attention to the utility of general
procedural codes such as the Ontario Statutorv Powers ProcedureAct, 9 the
American Administrative ProcedureAct 0 ' model, and the Administrative
Justice ..lot recommended by Nova Scotia's Law Reform Commission in its
1997 Final Report," Re/brin u/the ,4dministrativeJustice System in Nova
Scotia. Ultimately, my conclusion wrill be that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Law's 198 I .1fodel
State Administrative
Procchre .ct' - and its provision of a menu of hearing models provides a
sound basis for combatting tendencies towards oN er-judicialization within
the context of a general procedural code. I also see it as an antidote that
is preferable to relying on judicial re\-ie\, tribunal initiatives, or tribunalspecific legislation.
1. The Due Proce,,,sE.xlosion - .4 Potted Historv
l. Statutor1 Codification
In man\ senses, the first real manifestation of the "due process explosion"
in Canada \%as the Ontario Statutorl, Powers ProcedureAct. It came into
force in 1971 and was based on the recommendations of the McRuer
Commission Report, 3 a compendious study of government law and
institutions in the province of Ontario. John Willis. by then at the University
of Toronto Faculty of Law, had criticized trenchantly this portion of the

9.

Rs u

90,.c N.22. as am. hN S.0. 1491,c. 27,Sched..;S.O. 10 4,c.27,S.O. 1997.c.23,s.
13:

N ) 1999, : 12. Sched. B, s. If,, R.S 0. 2002, c. 17. Sched. F. [the Act] First enacted
as S.O. 1971,
t. 47. (In tact, the first admin,,istrative procedure statute in Canada was the Alberta
Administrative
Pro(Medure hIt, S A 0,, c I (now R.S A 2tto, c \-3). a far less detailed
set of provisions, the
,,peration o which depends on Lieutenant Govemor in Council designation of the tribunal
(section 2)
or the pro, jsion of' the tribunal's enabling legislation.)
i0. Pub. 1, No 404. 61 Stat. 237(1946),
II.

Supra, note 6.

12, 15 1iL.A. I [Nhdcl Act].
13. Oniiri Royal COnn niu?')1 - hiquiry into Civil Rights, sol. I (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 196871).
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McRuer Report. 4 The proposals on which the Act was based offended
Willis because of their "one model fits all" mentality. Essentially, the Act
provided for an adjudicative, adversarial form of hearing in the style of the
regular courts, though without all of the procedural details and with some
nods in the direction of the particular nature of the administrative process
in the form of flexible rules of evidence," including the concept of official
notice,t" and the ability to restrict representation by counsel. 7
However, the Act was not universal in its application. By reason of
a statutory formula"' and specific exclusions, 9 it applied only to those
administrative tribunals that at that time would have been characterized
as more adjudicative than administrative in nature - bodies such as the
then Human Rights Board of Inquiry, the Ontario Municipal Board,
the Ontario Labour Relations Board, and the like.2 0' The Act also
contemplated modifications by specific statutory provision of the extent
of its application to even those bodies" and, indeed, an omnibus Act was
passed contemporaneously making hundreds of such adjustments..2 2 As
well, the Act created the Statutory Powers Procedure Rules Committee
which was charged with the monitoring of the Act's operation and also
the procedures of those decision-makers not coming within the general
ambit of the legislation.23 In other words, there had been a certain amount
of tailoring and recognition that the basic model was not suitable for all

14. John Willis, 'The \lcRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Scrvants' Values" (1968) 18
U.T.L.J. 351 at 358-59. See also John Willis. "Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect" (1974)
24 U TL.J. 225 at 240-41. 1deal in greater detail with this aspect of the Willis critique of McRuer in
'Willis %.McRuer: A Long Overdue Replay with the Possibility of a Penalty Shoot-Out" (2005) 55
U.T.L.J. 535 at 561-72.
15. Statuto, Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. 22, s. 15.
16. Ibid.,
s. 16.
17. Ibid., s. 22(2), (3).
18. S. 3(l) requires that the tribunal be exercising "a statutory power of decision" and be required
under its empowering legislation or "otherwise by law" to hold or afford to the parties a hearing before
reaching a decision.
19. S. 3(2) contains a list of exclusions, including the courts, mn estigative and rule-making bodies. As
well, the Civil Rights StatuteLaw Amendment Act, 1971, S.O. 1971, c.50, enacted contemporaneously,
included a multitude of mostly partial exclusions and that pattern has continued in subsequent Ontario
legislation establishing administrative tribunals, with the application of the Act sometimes excluded
in whole or in part.
20. Supra note 15 at s. 3(1). In effect, the Ontario Court of Appeal interpreted section 3(1) as
restricted to those bodies specifically required to hold a hearing or which, under 1971 common
law, were sufficiently judicial in character to attract to a common law obligation to comply with the
principles of natural justice. See Re 11tbb and Ontario Housing Corporation(1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d)
187 (Ont. C.A.).
21. Supra note 15 at s. 32. Section 32 provided that the Act applied save to the extent that it was
specifically ovemdden in other legislation.
22. See Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1971, supranote 19.
23. Supra note 15 at Part III.
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decision-makers and that even if generally suitable, specific adaptations
might still be necessary.
Moreover, as a model, it did (and does) have considerable attraction. It
trades in what most would regard as sound concepts of procedural fairness:
adequate and timely notice of what is going to be at stake at the hearing,"
an oral or in-person hearing at which the parties would have an adequate
opportunity to put forward their proofs and arguments and to contest the
other side's proofs and arguments," and, well in advance of the common
law, 26 a right to reasons on request. 2' As such, it served in many contexts as
a source that drafters of procedural rules looked to for guidance.
Nonetheless, with the exception of an earlier, more skeletal Alberta
Act and much later, very different Quebec" and British Columbia 21
administrative procedure Acts, the idea of such a model did not take hold
in Canada. Over the years, there was certainly some interest but a proposed
federal Act went nowhere" and the Nox a Scotia Law Reform Commission's
recommendations remain unimplemented (and I am told are moribund)
seven years later. Indeed, in time, the Ontario Act's reputation suffered.
Successive governments failed to prox ide proper funding and support for
the Statutory Powers Procedure Rules Committee and, as a consequence, a
core component of the whole reform exercise faltered and then faded away.
The Act also became dated in two important respects. In an era where
pre-hearing procedures (including various forms of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR")) were becoming more and more of a feature of regular
court proceedings and a 1e /wwc characteristic of many tribunal processes,

24

Sispra note 15 atss 6 and S
25. Primarily by implication firom ss. Ill, 12, 15.
", It %%as not until Buir v (anada %IlloNcrofCw:enship and Immigration), (199912 S.C.R. 817,
that the Supreme Court recognized that, at least in certain circumstances, statutory authorities had a
common la% duty to provide reasons for their decisions.
27, Supra note 15 at s.17(l). Section 7 of the Alberta -4dmii.traive Proccchsres-c! also contained
a reasons pros ision, in its case mandatory

2

4Admnistraitvi, Justic ,At, S.,), 1996, c. 54. The procedural dictates of Quebec are stated at a

far greater le%
clof generality than those of the Ontario Statutort Powers Procedure Act, supra note

15. The ,\ici does, hossever, make specific pro%ision for emergenc) situations as well as prescribing a
,tatcment ofprinciplcs to go%em those dispensing administratis e justice.
2). Administrtivc Trihunals, hci,
S.BC. 201)4, c. 45, described infra at text accompanying note 107Ox.
30I On \pril IX 195, the Administratic Law%Section of the Department of Justice issued its
Pr~sN,
al /,,,-a I'cderal..dmistrative HeartngsPoierN and Proc chures At under the name of Martin
Freeman, General Counsel. A re\ised \ersion %
as issued on December 21, 1995 and yet a further
re isimi. this time under the name of James H.L. Sprague of the Department's Public Law Policy
'Sc1in, in September 1 96. Thereafter, the initiative appears to have sunk without a trace.
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the Act was virtually mute on these matters." With rampant technological
advances, written and even electronic hearings were becoming the norm
or at least possible in many contexts. The Act wvas based on the traditional
oral or in-person hearings.
Eventually, in 1994, these concerns led to amendments to the Act.3 2
Unfortunately, the reality of the demise of the Statutory Powers Procedure
Rules Committee became the laNN and that Part of the Act was repealed.
More positively, the Act now recognizes and makes provision for ADR in
the form of mediation, 33 ,Aritten and electronic hearings, 4 and also more
fulsome pre-hearing procedures.3" However, in all of these respects, the
provisions in question are triggered only by a tribunal's exercise of its
newly conferred authority to make procedural rules. 6 This many tribunals
have done though, in a number of instances, in accordance with a standard
37
template.
All of this sounds promising and promotive of procedural flexibility,
and, in many respects, it has been. However, there is one sense in which
the new regime supported by the Act and the procedural rules adopted
by individual tribunals may have exacerbated the due process explosion.
Indeed, it was almost inevitable that, with the advent of court-like prehearing disclosure and discomer, regimes and the movement in the
direction of more court-like processes at actual oral or in-person hearings,
there would be an increase in the complexity of, and time taken over,
matters that go to formal hearings. " In many settings, pre-hearing motions
31. & X. supra note 15. made provision for prehearing exchange of inlbrmation other than notice of
hat is a far cr, from current disco\ er regimes, section Xprovides that N\here -the
the proceedings. In NN
good character, propriety of conduct or competence of a party" is in issue, the other side must. "prior
to the hearing" provide that party -'with reasonable information of any allegation."
32 In the Statute Laii Amendment Act, S.O. 1994, c. 27. The Act swas subsequently modified in
1997, 1999, and 2002; supra note 9. The original set of amendments came into force on April 1,
1995.
33. Supra note 15 at ss. 4.8, 4.9. While this paper argues for the recognition of a middle ground
between ADR and formal hearings, I do regard it as important that ADR be addressed in some detail
in any administrative procedure Act. The Ontario Act now does that. For an even more comprehensive
model, see the United States Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996. Pub. Law 104-320.
34. Supra note 15 at ss. 5.1, 5.2, and 5.2. 1.
35. Ibid. at ss. 5.3 and 5.4.
36. Ibid. at s. 25.1
37. Rules made under s. 25.1 (on file) in many instances have pro%isions in common.
38. 1must admit that this assessment is not based on any systematic empirical research but rather a
combination of my own observations as a part-time member of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
and conversations with other tribunal members and lawyers appearing before some of the province's
tribunals. It is also reflected in the pleas for less judicialization and more efficient procedures to be
found in the1997 Ontario Government Task Force on Agencies, Boards and Commissions in its Report
on Restructuring Regulatory & Adjudicative Agencies (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1997), ("Wood
Committee Report," after its Chair, Bob Wood, M.P.P.) and the 1998 Report of the Agency Reform
Commission on Ontario's Regulatory and Adjudicative Agencies, EverydavJustice (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1998) ("Guzzo Commission Report", after its Chair, Garry Guzzo, M.P.P.).
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abound, particularly over issues such as disclosure and discovery, and
a more adversarial environment features from the outset. In the course
of actual hearings, there are also many more formal objections to the
admission of evidence or other matters pertaining to the conduct of the
proceedings. All of these phenomena can and do have the consequence
of making settlement and other efforts at ADR much more attractive
alternatives than a formal hearing.
In some senses, that is a good thing from a policy perspective. However,
for those disputes where an oral or in-person hearing is essential or the
reasonable preference of one of the parties. the resource consequences
may have become much greater and effective access to a full hearing just
as problematic in the tribunal setting as it is in the regular courts. In such
a context, settlement can become an economic necessity - not a mutually
acceptable resolution of a problem. An) promise of the administrative
justice system as a more accessible \\ay of resolving issues has been
undercut. In creating the opportunities for more informal ways of resolving
issues, the fbrmal has become more formal in a way that redounds to the
disadvantage of man\ parties. It is trite that longer, more procedurally
complex hearings cost more and, where the pressures for settlement do
not work, the\ increase the possibility of unrepresented participants. This
too can lead to still further inefficiencies.
I \ill return to the whole issue of statutory procedural codes later.
Howc\ er, it is also important to evaluate what has been happening with the
common law of procedural fairness o\ er the same period.
2. The (ommon Lmw
It is now over twenty-fivc years since the Supreme Court of Canada
delivered its landmark judgment in Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk
(Rcginal.lhiiicipalitiy(iormmissionersof'Police.9 In that case, the Court
held that a probationar\ police constable wvas entitled at common law to
procedural fairness before he was let go. In so doing, the Court lowered
the threshold that the common law imposed for being able to assert a claim
to procedural fairness. This change opened the door to procedural fairness
claims on the basis of interests theretofore excluded from the benefit
of the rules of natural justice - inmates,"' those on parole" immigrants
(including convcntion refugee claimants) seeking status in Canada, 2 the

v)

[l1791

I

( R. 311 I\,Vch,,r ].

411 Cardtnal v Kent Invitfution, 119851 2 S .R. 64-,4
41.
Gough v ('anada,(a, mmulland,
I
Board) 1 99O). 45 Admin. L.R. 304 (F.C.T.D.), afrd. (1991),
47Admin. L.R 22h I( '.A,
42. Singh v ('anada luusicr "I Emploqrmnnt and Immigration), [19851 I S.C.R. 177, Baker v
Canadat (1hi,, r 0/ ( "tf:ci.:h and lmmigraionl. supra,note 26.
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holders of positions at pleasure, 43 those seeking tenure at universities, 44 to

name but a few. This clearl\ contributed to the "due process explosion"
but in a desirable form. The pre%ious law confining the reach of procedural
fairness to an often narrowly conceived category of "'true rights holders"
was far too restrictive of the circumstances under which procedural fairness
should have attended statutory and prerogative decision-making.
It was also the case that, in .Vicholson, Laskin C.J.C. (delivering the
judgment of the majorit )did not conceive of the lowering of the threshold
as also involving in this new terrain adherence to the norm of full natural
justice, characterized typically by a full-scale adjudicative hearing. In
remitting the issue of Nicholson's dismissal to the Board, Laskin C.J.C.
stipulated that the Board had a discretion to proceed orally or in writing."
Subsequently. in Knigh : India,, HcaLi School Division X0.
V
9,4" the Court
made it abundantly clear that a series of informal meetings in the nature of
contract renewal discussions vas perfectly adequate to fulfill the School
Board's procedural fairness obligations towards a director of education
who served at pleasure and whose contract \was not renewed.
Nonetheless, in what seems a typical manifestation of the notion of
"once bitten, twice shy,- administrators and indeed legislators often tend
to overreact to judicial correction of their procedural failings. Thus, when
the Board resumed its consideration of Nicholson's status, despite the
discretion to proceed in writing if it wished, the Board accorded Nicholson
an in-person hearing at which he \ as entitled to be represented by counsel,
to present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 7
We see this same phenomenon occurring in the context of student
matters at least at some universities. The Courts, in cases such as Khan
v ' have obviously imposed a quite high
v. Universin, oi Ottawa
standard
of procedural fairness on university decision-making processes which
have a significant impact on a student's academic status, whether it be
expulsion, suspension or the repeating of a year, including the requirement
of an in-person or oral hearing whenever issues of the student's credibility
arise. In practice, this then is translated into formal, lengthy hearings
on issues such as plagiarism. Thus, txvo or three summers ago, a threeperson panel of professors at my faculty spent a total of two weeks each

43. See, e.g., Knight v Indian HeadSchool Division \o. 19,[1990] I S.C.R. 653.
44. See, e.g.. Ruipere: v Lakehead Universitv (1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 427 (Ont. Di\ Ct.), afrd.
(1983). 147 D.L.R. (3d) 154 (Ont. C.A).
45.

Supra note 3Y at 32X

46. Supra note 43.
47. See the facts as recorded in Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk (RegionalAlmncipahtly
Commissioners of Police (1983), I1O.A.C. 65, at para. 3 (Div. Ct.).
48. (1997), 148 D.L.R. (4 ' ) 577 (Ont. CA.).
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hearing and deliberating on two plagiarism cases, cases that also took up
significant chunks of time of at least five other faculty members. Similarly,
a complaint by a student questioning the fairness of the assignment of
grades in a first-year course continued through all of his three years in
the LL.B. programme, involving many stages both within and outside
the faculty, occupying vast amounts of faculty time (including that of the
dean), and, ultimately, leading to the use of outside counsel by each side,
and all this NNith the possibility of an application for judicial review at the
end of the process. It is highly questionable N hether anyone's interests
are served by this escalation in process and whether in fact the cause of
procedural fairness. e\ en in an abstract sense, is forwarded by such lengthy,
multi-layered and resource heavN processes. It is also highly questionable
whether the courts through the common la%\ do in fact demand as much
process as this.
Administrators are not alone in this tendency to overreact. For over
twenty years (and indeed earlier in the month in which I delivered the
Read Lecture" ' ) Jeffrey Simpson of the Globe and M ail has been railing
against the Supreme Court of Canada for its 1985 decision in Singh v.
Ctanada (A inister ,lEmfplo'vinentand Immigration), ' " ajudgment which he
seemingly holds entirely responsible for Canada's costly and, in his view,
unmanageable refugee determination sN stem. Yet, at root, the prescription
that the Supreme Court laid down in that case for fairness or "fundamental
justice" in a convention refugee determination process was no more than
access in person to someone \\ith the authority to make a decision with
knowledge ot and an opportunity to contest those facts which were leading
towards a rejection of the application." That prescription, in a case where
rights protected by both the Canadian ('harter o1 Rights and Freedoms
and the Cunadian Bill o/Righs \%ere in jeopardy,- seems no more than an
assertion of the true core or essence of \\hat procedural fairness involves
and not as necessarily leading to the particular regime that Parliament
cnacted subsequently and has tinkered with ever since.
In other respects, hovever, the courts have contributed more directly to
the "due process explosion." The last twenty-fi\ e years of judicial review
ha\ e led to far higher levels of entitlement (in most, though not all contexts)

411 JefrrcN
Simpson "()ur refugee N.stcm cot,, more than %,e think" (;hdb, and ,t d (7 January
21(1041

Il'

50, Suprat note 42

51.

Supra note 42 at paras W)-4 and 100-1i.

52,

In tact, three of the judges decided the case b\ relifrence to sectbon 7 of the Charterand three

hNrelerence to scetion 2(c) of the Billf Righ y. the ,eenth judge, Ritchie J.,
not taking part in the
judgment.
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to access to all relevant ad%erse material at least at the hearing." In contexts
which have any passing similarity to the charging of persons with offences,
some courts (and agencies for that matter) have accepted the applicability
of the Sfinchcombe-4 criminal process rules of full pre-trial discovery of
the relevant fruits of the investigation. Thus, in Ontario, the Human Rights
Commission has been held subject to this obligation," while the Supreme
Court of Canada has recentl\ sustained as not unreasonable the Ontario
Securities Commission's adoption of such a regime.5 6 As already noted,
oral or in-person hearings hav e become the expected norm whenever
issues of credibility arise in an administrative adjudication. Long after the
obligation was accepted in both the Ontario Statutor' Powers Procedure

.Act' and the Alberta A4dministrative Procedures.A'l,Ju1,

the Supreme Court

in Baker v Canada (,linisterof Citizenshlip and Imnmigration)" held that
there was. at least in the context of many administrative adjudications, a
requirement to provide reasons for the ultimate decision. Tribunals and
courts are still struggling with the parameters of this principle.60 There
is also a much greater willingness on the part of the courts to demand,
in the absence of statutory authorization, that administrative adjudication
53. See. e.g.. .\apoliv British Columhia rli',rker C~unen.ationBoard) (I4X I)., 12h D.L.R. (3d)
179 (B.C.C.A.).
54. R. I: Stinchcombe, (199113 S C.R. 32o
55, Ontario (Human Rights Commissioni v Ontario (Board of Inquiry into .Vthwestern Gcwral
Hospital) ( I 3, 115 D.LR. 41")
279 1On. Div. Ct.,. though l ('CIB.4-GcigvLtd %Canada Matented
mledicime
Prices Reviewt Boardh, [ 199J4] 3 F.C. 425 (C.
A. .
56. Delotte & Touche LLP i: Ontario t'ecurities Commission). (2003] 2 S.C.R. 713.
57. Supra note 9.
5k Supra note 9.
59. Supra note 26.
60. See, e.g., Brochu %:Bank # Iontreal( 99 9), 251 N.R. 2117(FC.A.), holding that the obligation
does not attach to a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission not to refer a complaint to
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, a ruling follo%ed recently in Wang v Canada (,humter of Pubic
Safet., andEmergency Preparedness). 21115 FC 654. It isinteresting that, at the provincial level, Nova
Scotia really led the ,xay in the movement towards a common law requirement of reasons. For over
twenty years, Dean Read was the pan-time chair of the No%a Scotia Labour Relations Board. If I have
the story correct, in the early years of his tenure, he regularly gave reaons for his decisions. Howe er
all that changed when the Supreme Court of Canada quashed his ruling in Smith and Rhuland v
The Queen, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95, on the basis of the reasons provided by Dean Read for denying an
application for certification as a bargaining unit brought by a union which %%asunder the direction of
a member of the Communist Party of Canada. A. I heard it when I arrived at Dalhousie, the day the
judgment came down Dean Read declared that henceforth there would be no more reasons from the
Board, a resolution he allegedly kept until he retired and was replaced by Innis Christie. While Dean
Read's reasons were generally quite brief before his decision in Smith andRhuland, he limited himself
to findings of fact after that decision; see R. Blake Brown, "'To Err is Human, to Forgive Divine': The
Labour Relations Board and the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1947-1965" in P. Girard, J. Phillips &
B. Cahill, The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 1'54-2004 From Imperial Bastion to Provincial Oracle
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society, 21141. It was, however, in a Labour
Relations Board context that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 1997 accepted that the common law
of procedural fairness could require the provision of reasons: see Future Inns Canada Inc. r,Nova
Scotia (Labour Relations Board) (1997), 4 Admin. L.R. (3d) 248 (N.S.C.A.).
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processes be structured in such a way as to ensure that the decision-makers
are independent and impartial in an institutional sense. 6 Finally, in what is
not a full catalogue of procedural accretions to the administrative process,
account has to be taken of the influence since 1982 of the Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms. While it has not in fact had an impact on
as much of the administrative process as many thought originally, 2 where
it (and, in particular, section 7 and the principles of fundamental justice)
applies, there is often a tendency to see this as a procedure enhancer
beyond the levels expected normally by the common law. 63 However,
more significantly, in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent judgment in
hartin r:Nova Scotia (Wi-kers'Compensation Board),' it is now much
more the norm rather than the exception that adjudicative tribunals will
have to hear and rule on Charterand other constitutional issues that arise
in the course of proceedings before them, including Charterchallenges to
their empowering or enabling legislation. This, of course, can add major
dimensions to a hearing.
In using these illustrations, I am not in any sense being critical of all
of them. Some were long overdue such as the duty to provide reasons,
particularly if understood and applied in the flexible, context-sensitive
manner described by L' Heureux-Dub J.in delivering the majorityjudgment
in Baker.6' Ho\ever, especially when linked wvith the post-Nicholson
expansion in the overall reach of procedural fairness obligations, they in
total represent a considerable accretion to the detail of what the common
law will require in many settings. More generally, it is also the case that
the tone of much administrative adjudication has changed in the wake of
Vichol.on. Informality has become far less acceptable in a world where
the clientele of many administrative processes are represented by counsel
more familiar with the world of civil and criminal litigation and insistent
on the application of those standards. Indeed, the following extract from
John Willis's 1973 Caesar Wright Lecture, "Canadian Administrative Law
in Retrospect," ' well illustrates the change in the culture. In the context
61
ee, v i. 274--3174 Qwhe" Inc %. Qut;h, tRgiedcksperm d'alcool) [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919.
62 Mo,,i
recentl, as a consequence of Blencoc : British (olumbia (Human Rights Commission),
1241101 2 S ('R.307, interpreting restricti%ely the scope ofiibert'" and "security of the person" in the
coneml tla complaint of violation of the anti-discnmnmation prowsions of a human rights code.
63. This emerges most clearly from Suresh v Canada (,tmn.twr of Cmtzenship and Immigration),
121102] I S R.3 at paras. 114-18, where the Court accepts that the fact that Charter rights are in issue
hclore a tribunal will add weight to the claim forprocedural protections, a claim that should not be
adjudicated by reference to straight common law principles.
64. [2003] 2 S CR. 504. See alko Paul v British Columbia (Forrt Appeals Commission), [2003] 2
S.C R. X5(applying the same principles to tribunal determination of First Nations rights issues) and
Oki uoht v L'tcr B,I'eoron School District, [2005] 1 S.',R. 257
65. Supra note 2f, at paras. 40-44
66.

Supra note 15.
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of extra-hearing contacts between a party and the decision-maker, Willis,
reflecting on his six years as a part-time member of the Ontario Securities
Commission, mused whether it

[w]as it all right for me. as chairman ofa disciplinar, panel, to telephone
the Commission lawx-er in the middle of a week's adjournment and tell
him -if you want to make good your position in this case you'd better get
such and such a piece of e\ idence' or "the line of argument you've been
pursuing will get you nowhere with us. wh. don't you try this one?" On
the civ il servant's side of my mouth m\ answer \Nas of course yes: as
members of a regulator\ authority xe were all, quite unlike honest to
god magistrates or judges. responsible for the future smooth working of
the area in which \ e \\ ere to gi\e our decision; \%e could not afford the
do-nothing luxury of complete neutrality that they enjoy. On the lawyer's
side of my mouth my answer \%as "xxell. I \ onder; \ hoe\ er heard of a
magistrate phoning the crowvn attorney with suggcstions of that kind"
and as I did my telephoning I x,,as alwa\s apprehensixe of what Mr.
McRuer might say. u"
Willis goes on to provide support in the contemporary literature for the
activist position."8 Howe\ er, wxhile conceding that this kind of intervention
still goes on even in the case of some judges, I would venture to say that
today, a court would have no hesitation xNhatsoever in disqualifying Willis
from participation on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias."
A combination of increased formality and commitment to adversarial
adjudicative principles in such contexts, greater judicial valuing of the
impact of discipline on the career of financial market registrants as x\ ell as a
stronger general jurisprudence condemning such informal contacts betxween
adjudicators and parties xwould coalesce to condemn the conduct.
II. Dealing with the Dilemma
Such is the extent to which the public psyche has been imbued with the
values of procedural fairness that it is difficult to envisage a reversal of the
overall trend toward more extensive procedural protections. Returning to
the "bad old days" is simply not a feasible political or legal option at least
in the sense of withdrawing procedural decencies from those situations
brought under the umbrella for the first time by Nicholson. Indeed, it is
hard to quarrel with the overall ambitions of the judgment in Nicholson: its
recognition that common law hearing entitlements should be more broadly
allocated than previously and the concomitant acceptance that, within the
67. Supra note 15at241-42.
68. Ibid at 242, citing Robert F. Reid, "Bias in the Tribunals" (1970) 2(0 U.T.LJ. 119 at 136-38.
69. The strongest support for this is found in 2747-3174 Qu~bec Inc. v Quebec (Rigie des permis
d'alcoob, supra note 61, and its insistence on maintaining an internal separation between the
prosecutorial and adjudicative arms of the tribunal.
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new world of procedural fairness, a concept of "one model fits all" could
not prevail- that the exigencies of specific decision-making contexts had to
be reflected in a flexible approach to determining the scope of procedural
rights.
Ho\\ ever, the desirability of much of the expansion notwithstanding,
there still seems to me to be life left in Felix Frankfurter's famous
admonition. The origins and objectives of most administrative agencies
should "preclude wholesale transportation of the rules of procedure,
trial and rev ie \v hich have evolved from the history and experience of
courts".'" In some circumstances, however, legislation, the common law,
or the voluntary practice of administrative adjudicators have in effect
coalesced to bring about such a transportation. As a consequence, there is
a case to be made for stepping back and assessing whether better or more
alternatives exist.
Indeed, there is something of an irony in the fact that, at least in
Ontario, reforms of process in the regular courts have shown the way
to more flexibility in administrative agency processes. Thus, the 1994
and 1999 amendments to the Statutor Powers Procedure Act and the
rules of man\ of the province's administrative tribunals reflect the new
regime of the regular courts in their emphasis on pre-trial clarification and
simplification of the matters in issue and the value of access to mediation
and other forms ofADR. Howvever, I do wonder whether simple transferral
of the court regimes of pre-trial process and possibilities for mediation,
settlement discussions, and the narrowing of issues is enough. Surely,
there is room for at least some administrative agencies to both think and
act outside the box. In particular, there should be attention to whether there
are points between mediation and other processes aimed at settlement, on
the one hand, and full adjudication, on the other.
In this regard, the United States National Conference of Commissioners7
on Uniform State Laws 1981 Mchl/el State Administrative Procedure Act
provides some guidance in its recognition of several types of hearing
ranging from the formal process characterized by close proximity to
criminal and civil trials and exemplified by the original form of Statutor,
Poweir Proct'uhre Act hearing, through conference hearings, summary
adjudicative hearings, and emergency hearings. The merit of this model (as
opposed to one where the alternatives are in effect "mediate or litigate") is
that it does present options for an actual hearing and adjudication without
following the full formal model. If operating optimally, the more informal
70.

Federal (ommuncation.%Commission v Pottsville Broadcasting ('o., 309 U.S. 134 at 143

(1940).

71,

,S;pranotc 12.
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options w\ill make a true hearing more accessible and also serve the
traditional administrative justice objectives of speedy, low cost, efficient
but effective resolution of issues. Writing in the highly problematic domain
of social welfare regimes (where any money spent on hearings can have
an impact on the availability of funds for substantive programmes), Rabin,
around the time of Nicholsoi. proposed an informal model that could
well serve many administrative justice schemes: "[h~ave an independent
hearing officer who provides the claimant with a documented statement of
reasons with an opportunity to respond though written or oral arguments
- after which the examiner is required to provide a written explanation for
his decision. ".72-

It has, ofcourse, long been recognized that, as in the world of real courts.
administrative processes simply cannot work if all cases go forward to a
hearing, even an informal one. Settlement, compromise through mediation.
and plea bargaining are all vital components of the process. Howexer,
hearings and trials do have a value aside from providing participatory
rights and justice to the parties. As opposed to settlement and mediation
processes, they generally provide a public record and precedents for the
resolution of future matters with like facts and issues, and are especially
valuable at the remedial end of proceedings.
These points (and others about the value of public trials) have been made
recently in an American Bar Association Report entitled The lznishing
Triar and they have resonance in the world of the administrati-e process.
The fewer the number of adjudications, the less guidance there will be for
mediations and other forms of settlement discussion, and when negotiations
take place both in secret and in a relative vacuum, the opportunities for
outcomes influenced by economic and other forms of might or duress
increase dramatically. The integrity of many administrative processes may
well depend on a sufficient number of adjudications, and, if a formal model
of adjudication is the only hearing option that is available, there is a strong
possibility in some contexts that that critical mass may cease to exist.
Let me therefore explore in somewhat more detail the terms of the
1981 Model State Administrative ProcedureAct ("Model Act") to assess
whether this might provide an appropriate vehicle for opening up the
possibility of a range of procedural options within a general administrative
procedure statute.

72. R.L. Rabin, "Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Values and Procedural
Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing Cases" (1979) 16 San Diego L. Rev 301 at 311.
73. Marc Galanter, The IlanishingTrial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts (2004). online: American Bar Association <http://www.abanet.org/litigation/
vanishingtrial>. See also Judith Resnik, "Procedure's Projects" (200)4) 23 C.J.Q. 273.
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While a formal trial-type hearing is the default position under the
Model Act, 4 as mentioned already, it makes provision for three other
species of hearings: conference," - summary, " and emergency. 77 However,
as with many of the "new" provisions in the Ontario Statutory Powers
Procedure Act, these alternatives, with the exception of the emergency
option, require a trigger to be available to any agency coming within
the reach of the Act: the agency must adopt rules providing for these
options. This process itself engages the notice and comment opportunity
obligations attached to rule making under the Model Act,79 leading to the
strong possibility that there will be constituent involvement and perhaps
even consensus over the detail of the rules that emerge.
Leaving aside the exceptional category of emergency procedures, the
least formal of the three other options is the summary hearing. Asimow has
characterized its essential characteristics: "'[i]n short, summary procedure
entitles a person subject to an adverse agency decision to have appropriate
notice, a chance to state his or her point of view, an explanation of an
adverse decision, and an administrative review of the decision."80
This contrasts with conference hearings which have many more of the
trappings of a formal hearing but dispense with a pre-hearing conference
and subpoenas or discovery. There is also "no formal presentation of
evidence or cross-examination, and no right of non-parties to participate."
Rather, "the parties can testify, present written exhibits, and offer
comments on the issues. Some elements of a formal hearing are retained:
the requirements of notice, an unbiassed decisionmaker, separation of
functions, limits on ex parte contacts, a statement of findings and reasons,
8
and agency revie%%..." 1
It must, howe\ er, be acknowledged that the 1981 Model Act has not
attracted significant legislative support in the United States. Thus Asimow,
a strong supporter of many of the components of the Model Act, reports
that it "has been adopted only in a very few states" and even then "[n]one

74. ',iqira note 12 at s 4-201(2).
75. Ibid at s. 4-401, 4-403.
76. Ibid ats 4-5412, 4.506.
77. Ibid at s. 4-501.
79, Ibid ats. 4-201(3).
79. Ibid at ss. 1-102, 3-103, S. 1-112 defines a rule to include rules of procedure and practice.
XIO. Michael As'irnmim, "'hmairds a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamcnil," ( I,2)2j 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1067 at 1101.
91.
Ibid at 1097.
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of those states came close to adopting all of it."" - Among the explanations
he provides are its over-ambition, a concern that it subjected too broad a
range of decision-making to its adjudicatiN c provisions, and satisfaction in
many States with their existing administrative procedure legislation. "
Nonetheless, I do belie\e that there is a strong case for moving in
this direction and creating the possibility of tribunals experimenting with
"hearings" with varning levels of formalitv. Indeed, such flexibility is not
without precedent in Canadian la\\. Thus, for example, section I 10 of the
Ontario Labour Relations Aci, 1995

"

allows for the making of rules not

only dispensing with hearings but also permitting less formal hearings
notwithstanding the provisions of the Statutotr" Powers Procedure .4ct.
This has led to the adoption for certain purposes of a process described
as a consultation. On the Ontario Labour Relations Board's website, a
consultation is described as follow\s:
A consultation is less formal and meant to be less costly to the parties
than a hearing. The Vice-Chair or panel plays a much more active role
in a consultation. The goal of the consultation is to allow\ the ViceChair or panel to expeditiously focus on the issues in dispute and
determine whether any statutorn rights have been violated. While the
precise nature of the consultation \aries depending on the nature of the
case and the approach of the indiv idual adjudicators, there are some
universal features. To draw out the facts and arguments necessary to
decide whether there has been a \ iolation of a statute, the Vice-Chair or
panel may: (1) question the parties and their representatives; (2) express
vie,,xs; (3) define or redefine the issues, and (4) make determinations
as to NN
hat matters are agreed to or in dispute. The giving of evidence
under oath and the cross-examination of witnesses are normally not part
of a consultation, and \ hen the,. are, it is only with respect to those
matters that are defined by the Board. Because the opportunity to call
X2. NlichaelAsimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to theAdmimstrativeLaw Review Symposium
on State Administrative Law" (2001) 53 Admin. L. Rev. 395 at 390. See also Michael Asimow, "The
Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on California's Ncw Administrative Procedure
Act" (1996)32 Tulsa L. Rev. 297 at 320-22, in \hich he compares the 1995 CaliforniaAdministrative
Procedure Act to the 1981 Model Act. The California Act does not go as far as the Model Act, but
does nonetheless open up the possibility of"informal hearings": see Cal. Gov't Code, ss. 11455.10
-11455.60.
83. Ibid. Indeed, the National Conference of Commi'. ioner,, on Uniform State Laws has now
embarked on another revision of the Model Act, a revision that proposes to abandon the approach of
the 1981 Model Act and move much more in the direction proposed by the Law Reform Commission of
Nova Scotia in its Final Report, supra note 6 (and described in more detail in the notes accompanying
notes 105-06, below): a set of compulsory or core principles followed by additional options: see U.S.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, Prelminar , Report on Model State
Administrative Procedures 4Ac,(Pittsburgh: 2005), online: The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws <http://wwwlaw/upenn.edu/bll/ulc/msapa/2005AMAdminReport.htm>
The American Bar Association is also studying the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and is
recommending revision.
84. S.O. 1995, c. 1, ScheduleA.,ss. 110(20)(b), 110(21).
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witnesses and present evidence is limited, the Board relies heavily on
the information that isprovided in the application and response. As such,
the parties are required to provide in their application and response all
of the material facts that they intend to rely on. Parties who fail to do so
may not be allowed to present any evidence or make any representations
about these facts at the consultation.
In short, what the Board seems to have adopted is an alternative process

that has some of the features of an inquisitorial model and some of the
features of the Model Act's own conference style of hearings. If one accepts
that there is a need to be wary of the tendency to overjudicialization of
tribunal procedures, such experiments in altematix ehearing methodologies
are to be encouraged.
However, the problem that the Labour Board example raises is how
this willingness to deploy different hearing models might become more
widespread. It is, of course, significant that the Board's constitutive Act
conferred specific authority on the Board to engage in this kind of exercise,
an authority that applied notwithstanding the provisions of the province's
Staituitor Powers Povcchir, ..hci. Without that kind of explicit authority,
the pro\ isions of the Statuto-' Powers Procedure .Jut itself would have

been insufficient to permit such experimentation. Certainly, the Act does
confer rule-making po\\ers on those tribunals coming within its reach. 6
However, that rule-making power is related specifically to the terms and
structure of the Act," and those terms and that structure are essentially
formal in both their philosophy and detail. Of course, it might be argued
that the ability to hold written and electronic hearings conferred by the
Act does create a window of opportunity for experimentation. However,
those bare-bones provisions would not seem to allow for the creation of
a range of in-person hearing opportunities of the kind envisaged in the
Model Act of 1981. The intermediate terrain between the truly formal and
purely paper or electronic hearings remains unoccupied.
More generally, there have to be concerns as to whether the general
procedural rule-making powers contained in statutes establishing tribunals
,'
Ontario, \djudication, Ontario Labour Relations Board (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 2013) online:
Ontar I abour Relations Board <http://,%\%vw.olrb.go\.on.ca'englishihearing.htm>. See also Ontario
Labour Relations Board, Information Bulletin, No II Duty of Fair Representation Applications
(Toronto 210l 1). online Ontario Labour Relations Board <htip://olrb.go,,.on.ca/english/infob/intbul I I.
him--.
X6.
Sipra note 15at %25.1 1).
X7. By kirtue of s 25.1(3), any rules made under section 25.1(1) must be consistent with the
Slufttfn Posier Pro, edu reAct and "the other Acts to %h ich they relate." There may also be problems
in situations vhcrc the tribunal's constituti'c statute calls for the tribunal to "hold a hearing" (e.g.,
Ontario Human Rigts 04c, R.S 0. 1990, c. H.19, s. 301I )), By sirtue of s. 3( I)of the Statutor.
Iowr Psm, edurA 4t that language triggers the processes of that Act and presumably forecloses the
tribunal from ccrcising its rule-making po%cr, to opt for anything less formal than that model.
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across Canada (and even today exercised most commonly by way of
Governor-in-Council or Lieutenant-Uo\crnor-in-(ouncil regulation
rather than unilaterally by the tribunals themselves) are apt to confer the
authority to provide the kind of menu of possible procedures characterized
by the Model Act. At the \er\ least, it is to be expected that any mandatory
imposition of infbrmal procedural regimes Nill encounter procedural
unfairness claims in the courts.
Of course, it may be the case that enlightened judges will recognize
the merits of any such procedurally flexible regime and be wvilling to read
expansively the procedural rule-making powers attached to that tribunal's
constitutive statute. Howe\er, there isalwvays the pull of traditional
adjudicati\ e models, models w ith which the judges in general are more
familiar and comfortable. It is also the case that the courts do not have
the capacity to be proactive agents of s\ stem-v. ide change in relation to
issues of this kind. Our courts have not sho \n (and perhaps legitimately
so) any inclination to compel agencies and tribunals to engage in rulemaking let alone to prescribe the parameters and the content of the rules
that they would like to see emerge from that exercise. Their role is largely
reactive albeit one that at times can and does lead to significant procedural
adaptation" though seldom other than incrementally or on a situationspecific basis.
Of course, o%er time, the imperati\ es of limited budget and personnel
may lead tribunals themselves more and more in the direction of informal
procedures as a matter of practice even without specific legislative
mandate. On many occasions, this may NN
ell have the support of affected
constituencies (the clientele of the tribunal) who are struggling with their
own resource issues and cannot afford either the cost or the delay or both of
the legislated formal procedure. In this regard, the Human Rights Tribunal
of Ontario is instructi%e to the extent that it offers mediation of complaints
referred to it by the Human Rights Commission, " a service that is utilized
frequently and to considerable effect albeit that the Commission itself
is statutorily mandated to try to effect a settlement as part of its initial
investigative process."

XX See Baker ii Canada rAhnister fl Citizenshq and Immigration), supra note 26, with respect
to the duty to gi'.e reas ons: and Martin v Nova Scotia tiiorkers'CompensationBoard). supra note

64, with respect to the authority of tribunals to consider Charter and other species ol constitutional
question.
89. See Ontario, Human Rights Tribunal (fOntario Rules ofPractice, rules 49-53. The authority for
the adoption of a mediation option comes from s. 4.X( 1) of the Statutor , Powers Proccdhr ,i.
90. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. s. 33(I).
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Indeed, as early as 1970, in an article rejecting the idea of a New
Zealand administrative procedure statute," J.A. Farmer made this very
point based on his observation of the real life workings of the American
Administrative Procedure Act:
By prov iding procedures Nhich are too formal to be successfully employed
in most cases, the APA has forced the development of informal, largely
unofficial, procedures in some areas where a wider adjudication (of a
more enlightened kind) might have been better. Similarly, it has diverted
attention away from the need for minimum safeguards to be established
in those cases where informal adjudication is practised as being the only
feasible alternative. 2
Reflecting many of the very same concerns, that same year, John
Willis, in his critique of the McRuer Commission proposal for an Ontario
administrative procedure statute, "' was at his pungent best. Later, he
was to describe the formal hearing processes of the Statutor, Powers
Procedure Act as lacking any real root in "the world of what actually
happens as opposed to the dream world of lawyers." " However, he was far
more inclined than Farmer to remain content with the informal processes
developed by tribunals and agencies. As the quotation makes clear, Farmer
was not sure that what came out of perceived operational necessity was
inevitably the appropriate way for tribunals and agencies to carry out
their decision-making responsibilities. Other means had to be found for
striking a balance between, on the one hand, the pressures on agencies
and tribunals to protect their resources through the development of extralegal, informal mechanisms and, on the other, the rights of stakeholders
to a procedure that afforded a sufficient degree of procedures to allow for
fair and appropriate substantive outcomes. The compromises that emerged
from such a totally internalized process of evolving extra-legal, informal
processes were not guaranteed to be in the public interest or that of affected
constituencies.
That then brings me back to the whole idea of a general statute against
which Farmer, Willis, and others" railed. Let me rehearse their principal
criticisms. Focussing on the American Administrative ProcedureAct or

91. J.A Farmer, "'A N1odel (ode ol Procedure I.0r Administrative Tribunals: An Illusory Concept"
(197(0) 4 N./.U.L Re\, 1O5.
102 Ibid at 115,
91 "The McRuer Rcpor La %yers' Values and Civil Ser ants' Values". supra note 14 at 358-59.
94 "Canadian Administrative LaN% in Retrospect". supra note 14 at 241.
95. Another sceptic is Margaret Allars, "A General Tribunal Procedure Statute for New South Wales"
(1993) 4 Public Law Re\ ieN% 19. Indeed, the birth of the 1946 ,4dministrativeProcedure Act was not
without controversy. See, e g, Arthur Earl Bonfield. State .ldministrative Rule Making (Boston: Little
Brown. 1986, %kith1992 Supplemen) at 1.2.3.
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the model recommended by McRuer, these critics were concerned about
the extent to which such statutes were based on a concept of "one model
fits all" and, secondly. on standard conceptions of judicial decisionmaking. However, those concerns do not speak necessarily to the folly
of any kind of administrative procedure statute. More particularly, it is
certainly possible to think in terms of a general statute that recognizes and
authorizes a variety of decision-making processes; one which provides
a framework or a template for tribunal development of appropriate
decision-making processes within the realm of formal law, as opposed to
informally or extra-legally. Indeed, as suggested already, the 1981 Model
Act exemplifies those objectives.
Farmer's general preference for a checking mechanism to curb
the rogue tendencies of internally developed processes while, at the
same time, encouraging diversity \%as a modified version of the British
Council on Tribunals. In the specific case of New Zealand, he advocated
an independent body operating within but not under the control of the
Ombudsman's office. Its mandate would be ongoing review of all tribunals
and it would have the authority to direct those tribunals to modify their
rules, presumably both formal and informal."
I have no problem with the creation of such a body. Indeed, it was one
of the misfortunes of the Ontario system that a similar body, the Statutory
Powers Procedure Rules Committee, established under the Statutorty
Powers Procedure Act was not maintained by successive governments
and then legislatively abolished.' However, that in itself is a salutary
lesson. When a province as resource rich as Ontario cannot fund and staff
appropriately a body of this kind, one that was mandated by statute, it
has to be wondered whether it is a realistic possibility in other provinces
or territories.98 At the very least and in any event, there is a strong case
to be made for specific, legislative attention to the overall procedural
dimensions of administrative justice in the form of a general framework
within which procedural rules are made and which recognizes the need
for diversity albeit within some kinds of constraints which have as their
principal objective prevention of the too ready compromising of bedrock
procedural fairness imperatives. Ideally, that statutory regime might well
be supported by the creation of a tribunals office of some kind but, even
without it, the statute itself could provide both the means and the impetus
96. Supra note 91 at 118-19.
97. As noted earlier, the Committee was abolished legislatively when the Statute Law Amendment
Act, S.O. 1994, c. 27 repealed Part Ill of the original Statutor. Powers Procedure Act.
98. In British Columbia, this role is now being played in some measure by the Administrative
Justice Office, within the Ministry of the Attorney General. This was a spring 2003 offshoot of the
Administrative Justice Project <http://www.gov.bc.ca/ajo>.
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for tribunals to develop transparent. constituency-supported models of
decision-making procedure.
In recent years, there haxe been many Canadian studies of the
administrative process including its procedural dimensions" In the last
decade, those studies have led to significant legislative changes in British
Columbia,""' Ontario,"" and Quebec. I"2 However, in four otherjurisdictions,
significant proposals for legislative reform of tribunal processes have been
left to collect dust: Alberta, Ne\N Brunswvick, Nova Scotia and federally,
though the Saskatchewan La\\ Reform Commission consultation appears
to be ongoing.
It is,ho\ ev er, the case that, with one exception,0 3 none of these studies
(or subsequent legislati\e action) has really considered seriously the kind
of framework found in the 1981 Model Act. Certainly, mediation and other
forms of ADR are al\\ ays touted as a potential cure for the ills of many
administrative tribunals. Rejection of the "'one model fits all" concept
is uni ersal. In turn, this has led to recommendations for administrative
procedure legislation \\ hich w-ould spell out a base level of procedural
fairness and then confer on the tribunals themselves the capacity to
develop or tailor additional procedures to their individual needs. A good
example of this is the 1997 La\\ Reform Commission of Nova Scotia
Final Rcort on Re/inr-i oi the .4id inistrative Justice System in Nova
Scotia. Indeed, the most recent of the reforms, the 2004 British Columbia
..tdniinitratii'eTribunals Act actuallN goes e\en further in the direction of
tribunal autonom\. It contains \ erx few provisions of the kind found in the
Ontario SlatutoryT ucr. Pr chire Act. Indeed, rather than concerning
itself with spelling out rules of procedure that constitute the ordinary stuff
of the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness, it simply confers on
tribunals (subject to their constitutive legislation) "po\\ er to control [their]

,'

In addition to the tideral, British Columbia and \o\. Ncotia initiatives referred to earlier
jbupra notc, h. 7, and 31, and ,c.,,mpanying text). there ha\e been studies in Alberta (Alberta Law
Rclorm Institute. Final Report No 71, Vo cr, atidProccdurts,fr.4dtnmistrativc-Tribunals in .herta
I dimnton: 1P499; i)uhcc (Rapport du Group le travail sur les trihunaux administratfs (Quebec:
\Mnistr) of Justice. 10 7 i"the Ouellette Report"); Rapport d
riiqk, de travail sur certaines
qiitestioi rt'lative a la rtf ortti,' e IaJu.tu t'atdministrativcI )uebec: \ImistrN of Justice, 194) (-the
(J'aranlt Reporn"). \e, Bruns%%ick (Prnppoab for an .Idniiniitrativ' Prm cwvv c :4c
.4 Discusvion
Pciw, (.aw Rcflrm Branch, Office of the Attomye General. 19911); Saskatchewan (Law Reform
( ommission of Saskafchc\ in. ( iitultation Paper .4 1todlt Cmle of'lPi'tiedtur'e.for.4dmmnistrath'e
trihunal, 2iiifl
hiip'//\1s Ias refirmeomm,,on.k.ca \dminl.htm>; and Ontario (detailed
int. For an exceilent summary ol thecs reports (with the e\ccption of the subsequent Saskatchewan
iiiatl\,ch. cc Falzon, itipra note 7 at 29-47.
1Ott. 4dinit~srativ, Trlhunal., Act. iqpra note 7.

I1. Supra note 15 principalI, in the 19914
and 1999 amendments.
1012. Sunpra note 28,
1(03. sce te\t -,ccompa'ing in/i-a note I I1.
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own processes and [to] make rules respecting practice and proccdure to
facilitate the just and timely resolution of the matters before [them]".'"' 4
Under both these models, the recommended draft Nova Scotia
Administrative Justice. Act and the British Columbia ,.lministrative
Tribunals 4ct. 2004. it would certainly be feasible for an administrative
tribunal, by the exercise of its rule-making powers, to prov ide for a system
of varying levels of hearing as in the Model Act. However, there may
be impediments real or perceied to doing this. Under the Nova Scotia
recommendations, not only \ ould tribunals be constrained by the tens
of the base level procedures, 0 but also by a further list of provisions that
would apply on a default basis."* In total, the minimum and the default
rules amount to a traditional adversarial. highlyjudicialized form of hearing
and might very Nvell act as a disincentive to tribunals experimenting and
moving too far away from the template. While the British Columbia Act
is superficially much more liberalizing, it is, howe'er, significant (and
for understandable reasons) that the list of specific subjects on which the
tribunal may make rules amounts, aside from a reference toADR," to a list
of all the powers associated with typical adjudicative processes.' More
generally, it is my view that tribunals are influenced by templates created
by statutes or otherwise, and that. if greater creativity is the objective with
more flexible options the end product. the empowering legislation will in
most instances have to be more blunt or directive on the subject of varying
levels of procedural entitlement and diverse hearing models.
Indeed, to my kno\ ledge, the only study that came at all close to
thinking in these terms was the 1997 Ontario Government Task Force
on Agencies, Boards and Commissions in its Report on Restructuring
Regulator, & Adjudicative .4gencies." This report, most commonly
known by the name of its Chair, Bob Wood, MPP, in a very short section
proposed "two prototype hearing procedures - one quick and one complex.
The quick procedure sets out a process for the application, response,
hearing (oral, written or electronic) and decision - all within sixty days in
most cases. The complex procedure would allow up to seven months from

104, Supra note 30 at s. II(1).
105. Part 11("Minimum Procedures"). s. 5-15
106. Part III("Standard Powers and Procedures"), s. 16-29. These default provisions may be
overridden by the tribunal', enabling Act or the tribunal's procedural regulations (section 17). Under
the proposed legislation. tribunals would have autonomy in the making of procedural rules: s.6(a).
107. Supra note 29 at 1l(2)(b), admittedly expressed as not limiting the terms ofs. 11(1).
108. Supra note 29 at 11(2)(a)-(w. Sections 12 and 13 also provide for the making of practice
directives.
109. Supra note 38.
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application to decision in most cases - with mandatory mediation before
any hearing." '"10
While this recommendation required much more flesh to become a
realistic option, it was not taken up either legislatively or specifically in the
1998 Report of the Agency Reform Commission on Ontario's Regulatory
and Adjudicative Agencies, Everi'dav Justice (the "Guzzo Commission
Report").'' However, that Report did make favourable reference to
the processes of the Ontario Insurance Commission (now part of the
Financial Services Commission of Ontario). '"2 According to the Report,
the Commission had a three-stage process in cases arising out of the
automobile accidents benefits scheme: mediation, neutral evaluation, and
arbitration, with 80% of cases at that time being resolved at the mediation
stage. The Commission then went on to urge the importance of devising
tribunal processes "to resolve disputes without necessarily holding a full
hearing."" " However, as with the British Columbia legislation, this report
saw this objective being accomplished best by greater tribunal autonomy
over the choice of "methods of providing faster, better service [which] are
best suited to their clients."' 4
While I have little problem with more procedural autonomy for
tribunals, it may well be the case that an initiative of the kind found in the
1981 Model Act ill require more than the conferral of discretionary power
that includes that possibility. Rather, explicit legislative commitment to the
project may be a prerequisite to many tribunals moving in this direction
given the persistence of the traditional adjudicative model and the various
pressures for its continued status as the norm. Indeed, one way of giving
this national prominence may well be to try to have the issue again made
part of the agenda of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. Back in
1991, the Conference in fact issued a Model Administrative Procedure
Code," 5 prepared by Professor Yves Ouellette, one of the very influential
figures in the eventual enactment of the Quebec Administrative Justice
.4ct." 1 would suggest that the time has come for the Conference to revisit
this subject with the 1981 Model Act's proposals for varying levels of
hearing as its starting point.
I IW

Supra note 3X at 12.
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112, Mhid at 10.
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II5. Y es Ouellette, "A Model Administrative Procedural Code," online: Uniform Law Conference
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intended as a discussion or working paper.
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Conchlsion
The administrative justice system is frequently under stress. The
appointments process remains a recurring concern. In terms of resources,
all but a few tribunals fare a lot worse than the regular courts despite the
critical aspects of the overall justice system for which they are responsible.
Yet, the pressures remain to deliver a high quality product. It has been
one of the major thrusts of this paper that the delivery of that high quality
product is not necessarily contingent on following court-like adjudicative
processes. Indeed, in many instances, judicialization can impede
significantly the effective and efficient management of mandates and tax
severely already limited resources. To that extent, considerations ofjustice
and optimal management of budgets and personnel coalesce in encouraging
both tribunals and legislatures to become more imaginative and flexible
in the processes that are deployed in the exercise of decision-making
functions. In this regard, mediation and other forms of ADR have become
indispensable features of the functioning of many administrative tribunals.
In this lecture, I haN e suggested that, at present, for many tribunals, there
is in fact no real middle ground between the 'informality" ofADR and the
"formality" which characterizes those tribunals' constitutive statutes or
procedural rules and, indeed, a statute such as Ontario's Statutol3 ' Powers
ProcedureAct. More needs to be done in terms of experimenting with
alternative decision-making modes and opening up the possibility of the
same tribunal functioning with varying levels of formality depending on
the nature of the matters in issue and, at least in some contexts, the wishes
of the tribunal's clientele. While some tribunals have in fact moved in
this direction, it is my sense that this is an initiative that requires explicit
legislative recognition and encouragement. At present, such a model exists
in the form of the 1981 .ModelState Administrative ProcedureAct, with its
provisions for four levels of hearing process. This model deserves serious
evaluation in a Canadian setting and the best way of ensuring that may
well be to persuade the Uniform Law Conference to revisit the question of
administrative procedures, something it did last in 1991.

